The State of Utah v. Ernesto Hernandez : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2002
The State of Utah v. Ernesto Hernandez : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Benjamin A. Hamilton.
Katherine Peters; David Yocom.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Hernandez, No. 20020576 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3883
I M Mil I I Ml I UUP I U l MMM.AI.S 




BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 20020576-CA 
I MIL! • >1 APPELLEE 
AN AlTLAL IRU'-i A v U.W K i iU.\ i UK i>KI\ . N(I I N;>< !•; \\i\ 
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL WITH A PASSENGER UNDER blXlEEN 
YEARS OF AGE IN THE VEHICLE. A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR IN 
VIOLATION OF I TAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1999), IN THE THIRD 
DISTRIC r COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE ANN 
BOYDrNPPi ' : ? - ' • -
Ul-NJAMIN A HAMILTON (6238) 
356 Easi WO Simiii 
Salt I .ike City, I tab 84111 
( oun^el for Appellant 
{CATHERINE PLIERS (9143-
DepuU District Attorney 
D-WIP VOCO\l(3581) 
Salt Lake Count) District Attorney 
.?(»(>! South State Street, Suite .^700 
< -!• ( •:'• e ("'!• ! "T ^.1l*)n 
Counsel for .Appellee 
Utah v 
MAR 2 > 
Paujlc, 
n i * r b r%i Him i* 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 




BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL WITH A PASSENGER UNDER SIXTEEN 
YEARS OF AGE IN THE VEHICLE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1999), IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE ANN 
BOYDEN PRESIDING. 
BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON (6238) 
356 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KATHERINE PETERS (9143) 
Deputy District Attorney 
DAVID YOCOM (3581) 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
2001 South State Street, Suite 3700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Counsel for Appellee 
Counsel for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 7 
I. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL WITH A PASSENGER 
UNDER THE AGE OF SIXTEEN YEARS DOES NOT MERGE INTO THE 
OFFENSE OF RECKLESS DRIVING 7 
II. UTAH'S SHONDEL DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE EACH 
STATUTE CONTAINS UNIQUE, DISTINCTIVE ELEMENTS 12 
CONCLUSION 13 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - (Relevant Statutes) 16 
Addendum B - (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 19 
Addendum C - (Trial Transcript of Ernesto Hernandez, June 10, 2002) 23 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge #1743, B.P.O.E., 854 P.2d 513 (Utah 1993) 9 
Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177 (Utah 1998) 8 
Hous. Auth. of County of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, 44 P.3d 724 7 
State v. Bohne, 2002 UT 116, 63 P.3d 63 2, 7 
State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985) 12 
State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, 4 P.3d 795 8, 11 
State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 9, 10 
State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, 51 P.3d 55 2 
State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, 992 P.2d 986 9 
State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969) 12 
Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985) 8, 10 
V-1 Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906 (Utah 1997) 9 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(iii) 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(B) 1, 2, 7, 8, 13, 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b) 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 13, 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-182 3 
iii 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(2001) 1 
IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 




BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2001), this Court has jurisdiction over 
this case. This is an appeal from convictions for one count of Driving Under the Influence 
of Alcohol with a Passenger Under Sixteen Years of Age, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(B) (1999), in the Third District Court, the 
Honorable Ann Boyden presiding. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Do rules of statutory construction require merging the offense of Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol with a Passenger under Sixteen Years of 
Age with the offense of Reckless Driving? A trial court's interpretation 
1 
of statutory construction is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Bohne, 
2002 UT 116, % 4, 63 P.3d 63, 64 ("We review the appellate court's 
statutory interpretation for correctness."). 
2. Does Utah's Shondel doctrine require the defendant's conviction of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol with a Passenger under Sixteen 
Years of Age, a class A misdemeanor, to be sentenced at the lower 
offense of Reckless Driving, a class B misdemeanor? A trial court's 
conclusions of law are afforded no deference and are reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, f 12, 51 P.3d 55 
("[W]e review a trial court's conclusions of law based on such facts under 
a correctness standard, according no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions."). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(B) (1999) 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b) (Supp. 2002) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 30,2001, the defendant was charged with Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol with a Passenger under Sixteen Years of Age, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(B) (1999) ("DUI statute"), and Failure to 
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Wear a Seat Belt, an infraction, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-182 (Supp. 2002). 
R. 8. At trial, on June 10, 2002, before the Honorable Ann Boyden, the defendant 
stipulated to the facts that supported these charges. The defendant also stipulated to 
additional violations that were not formally charged by the State. R. 2. Specifically, he 
stipulated to Speeding and Following a Vehicle at an Unsafe Distance. R. 2. Defendant 
then moved to reduce all of the charges to Reckless Driving, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b) (Supp. 2002) ("Reckless Driving statute") 
arguing that the requirement of three or more moving traffic violations under the Reckless 
Driving statute had been met. R. 3. 
The defendant first argued the principles that underlie Utah's Shondel doctrine 
require the court to sentence identical offenses with differing levels of punishment at the 
lower level of punishment. R. 4. The defendant next argued that principles of statutory 
construction required the court to find that the Reckless Driving statute incorporated the 
Driving Under the Influence statute. R. 4-5. The State responded by arguing that Shondel 
was inapplicable in this case because the two offenses punished different types of conduct, 
and the statutes contained distinct elements. R. 5. 
Judge Ann Boyden denied the defendant's motion. R. 8. Judge Boyden first found 
that the offenses of Reckless Driving and Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol with a 
Passenger Under the Age of Sixteen Years are not identical offenses, and are thus exempt 
from consideration under Shondel R. 8. Furthermore, the defendant's statutory 
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construction argument was defective because the defendant had not been charged with 
speeding or following a vehicle at an unsafe distance, and thus, the court could not 
properly consider whether three or more traffic offenses had been committed by the 
defendant. R. 8-9. Judge Boyden also found that even if the defendant had been charged 
with the additional traffic offenses, that defendant's statutory construction argument failed 
because the two statutes punish distinct offenses. R. 9. 
Judge Boyden entered judgment, finding the defendant guilty of the offense of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol with a Ppassenger Under the Age of Sixteen 
Years, a class A misdemeanor. R. 13. Defendant was sentenced according to the statutory 
terms. R. 14. Defendant appealed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant was charged on June 30, 2001 with the offenses of Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol with a Passenger Under the Age of Sixteen Years and Failure to 
Wear a Seat Belt. R. 8. Although not charged with the following offenses, the defendant 
stipulated that he also committed the traffic violations of Speeding and Following Too 
Closely. R. 2. The trial court found the defendant guilty of violating only the DUI statute. 
R. 12. Defendant objected to a finding on this charge because he had stipulated that he 
committed four traffic violations under Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations 
of the Utah Code, thus warranting a conviction under Utah's Reckless Driving statute 
(Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b) (Supp. 2002)), a class B misdemeanor. R. 6. Defendant 
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also argued that Utah's Shondel doctrine required the trial court to sentence the defendant 
under the class B misdemeanor offense of Reckless Driving instead of the class A 
misdemeanor offense of the DUI statute. R. 3-4. Judge Boyden denied defendant's 
request because she found that the two statutes contained unique elements not found in the 
other. R. 8. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court found the 
following: 
1. On June 30, 2001 Ernesto A. Hernandez, defendant did drive 82 miles per 
hour in a 60 miles per hour posted zone; 
2. Defendant failed to wear his seat belt; 
3. Defendant followed the vehicle in front of his at an unsafe distance; 
4. Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol with a breath alcohol 
content of .155; and 
5. Defendant had his daughter in the car at the time who was under the age of 
sixteen years. 
Br. Aplt. at 6. The trial court's conclusions of law stated: 
1. Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol requires unique elements, inconsistent with 
those required for Reckless Driving. 
2. Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol requires that the operator of a motor vehicle 
be under the influence of alcohol or drugs whereas the crime of Reckless Driving 
does not. 
5 
3. Additionally, in this case the defendant was charged with Driving under the 
Influence of Alcohol with a Passenger Under Sixteen Years of Age in the vehicle. 
A passenger under the age of sixteen in the vehicle is not an element of Reckless 
Driving. 
4. Because Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol does not require evidence of traffic 
violations, although they may be used as contributing to a driving pattern, statutory 
construction is not relevant or at issue. 
Br. Aplt. at 6. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court properly found that the offense of Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol with a Passenger Under the Age of Sixteen Years does not merge into the offense 
of Reckless Driving. Rules of statutory construction require that statutes relating to the 
same subject matter must be construed together in order to give effect to the legislative 
intent. The defendant's interpretation would render the provisions under Title 41, Chapter 
6, Traffic Offenses and Regulations of the Utah Code redundant and ineffectual. 
2. The trial court properly found the Shondel doctrine inapplicable in this case because 
the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol with a Passenger Under the Age of 
Sixteen Years contains elements wholly distinct from those elements required under the 
offense of Reckless Driving. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL WITH A 
PASSENGER UNDER THE AGE OF SIXTEEN YEARS DOES NOT 
MERGE INTO THE OFFENSE OF RECKLESS DRIVING. 
The defendant claims that Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol with a Passenger 
Under the Age of Sixteen Years (Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(B) (1999)) ("DUI 
statute"), a class A misdemeanor, merges into the offense of Reckless Driving (Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b) (Supp. 2002)) ("Reckless Driving statute"), a Class B misdemeanor. 
Br. Aplt. at 8. Specifically, the defendant argues that because the trial court, in finding 
the defendant guilty of the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol with a 
Passenger Under the Age of Sixteen Years, found that the defendant committed four 
moving traffic violations under Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, thus 
warranting a conviction under the lesser offense of reckless driving. Br. Aplt. at 9. 
Matters of statutory interpretation are reviewed for correctness. See State v. Bohne, 
2002 UT 116, f^ 4, 63 P.3d 63, 64 ("We review the appellate court's statutory 
interpretation for correctness." (citing Hous. Auth. of County of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 2002 
UT28,t l0,44P.3d724). 
Utah's statute that prohibits Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol with a 
Passenger Under the Age of Sixteen Years states 
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle within this state if the person ... 
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(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at 
the time of operation or actual physical control.... 
(3)(a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of 
Subsection (2) is guilty of a ... 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person ... 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the 
offense 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(iii) and (3)(a)(ii)(B) (1999). Utah's Reckless Driving 
statute also falls under Title 41 and Chapter 6 of the Utah Code and states u[a] person is 
guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle while committing three or more moving 
traffic violations under Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of 
acts within a single continuous period of driving." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b) 
(Supp. 2002). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[statutes are considered in pari materia 
and thus must be construed together when they... have the same purpose or object." Utah 
County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985). Additionally, when Utah courts 
interpret statutes, their "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute 
was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ^  25,4 P.3d 795, 799-800 (citing to 
Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177,184 (Utah 1998)). This analysis of plain language requires 
Utah courts to "attempt to give each part of the provision a relevant and independent 
meaning so as to give effect to all of its terms." Id. at 800 (quoting V-1 Oil Co. v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906, 917 (Utah 1997)). The Utah Supreme Court stated that 
8 
"[wjhenever possible, statutes should be construed so that no portion is superfluous." 
Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge #1743, B.P.O.E., 854 P.2d 513, 518 n. 21 (Utah 1993). 
This construction has been interpreted by Utah courts as a requirement to avoid 
interpretations that render statutes redundant. See State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277,278 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). This requirement is based on the assumption that "every word in 
the statute was chosen advisedly by the Legislature, [and therefore courts] resist 
concluding it would have chosen redundant language." Id. at 279. 
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to merge the driving 
under the influence of alcohol statute into the reckless driving statute. Br. Aplt. at 11-12. 
The State agrees with the defendant that statutes must be construed according to their 
plain language and unambiguous language must not be interpreted to contradict the 
statute's plain meaning. See Br. Aplt. at 9 (citing to State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, ^ f 11,992 
P.2d 986). However, the defendant's interpretation of the rules of statutory construction 
actually contradicts the plain language of both the DUI statute and the Reckless Driving 
statute. The defendant fails to consider the rule that statutes relating to the same subject 
matter must be construed together. Under the defendant's interpretation, charges for 
reckless driving would take the place of charges under Utah's DUI statute when three or 
more traffic offenses occur. See Br. Aplt. at 12. This transformation of DUI offenses 
into reckless driving offenses is absent from the plain language of the Reckless Driving 
statute. Defendant's interpretation would make the DUI statute moot, and as previously 
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stated by this Court, redundant interpretations of statutes should be avoided. See 
Candelario, 909 P.2d at 278. 
Furthermore, defendant's interpretation runs contrary to the purpose and intent of 
Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations of the Utah Code. Statutes that have 
the "same purpose or object" must be construed together in order to give effect to both 
statutes. See Utah County, 699 P.2d at 709. In this case, this Court must construe the DUI 
statute and the reckless driving statute together because "they have the same purpose or 
object." Both statutes fall under the same section of the Utah Code: Title 41, Chapter 6, 
Traffic Rules and Regulations. The defendant even concedes that the two statutes relate to 
the same subject matter. See Br. Aplt. at 9. This chapter of the Motor Vehicle Act 
exhibits a concern for regulating traffic for the public's safety.1 
Under the defendant's construction DUI prosecutions of cases with three or more 
traffic violations would cease. The Legislature did not intend such a result with the 
1 For example, the Act regulates: obedience to traffic regulations (sections 41-6-11 to -
19.5); traffic signs, signals and markings (sections 41-6-20 to -28); procedures to 
follow when traffic accidents occur (sections 41-6-29 to -42); penalties for driving 
while intoxicated or reckless driving (sections 41-6-43 to -45); speed restrictions for 
vehicles (sections 41-6-46 to -52.7); rules of the road (sections 41-6-53 to -65); turns 
and signals for stopping, starting or turning (sections 41-6-66 to -71); right-of-way 
(sections 41-6-72 to -76.10); pedestrian rights and duties (sections 41-6-77 to -82.50); 
bicycles (sections 41-6-83 to -90.5); railroad trains and safety zones (sections 41-6-91 
to -94); special stops required by motor vehicles (sections 41-6-95 to -100.5); stopping, 
standing and parking (sections 41-6-101 to -104); and miscellaneous statutes dealing 
with the safety of motorists and pedestrians (sections 41-6-105 to -116.10); vehicle 
safety equipment (sections 41-6-117 to -180); and safety belt usage (sections 41-6-181 
to-186). 
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adoption of new language to the reckless driving statute. See Burns, 2000 UT 56, at f 25, 
4 P.3d at 800 (The "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative 
intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to 
achieve."). The defendant fails to explain how eliminating prosecutions under Utah's DUI 
statutes would achieve securing the public's safety. In order to establish probable cause to 
stop individuals suspected of driving under the influence, officers must find some 
combination of traffic violations to warrant a stop. If the defendant's interpretation of the 
reckless driving statute is upheld, then the State would have to charge a case as reckless 
driving when an individual with a blood alcohol content greater than .08 commits three or 
more traffic violations. This interpretation runs contrary to the purpose of Title 41, 
Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations - regulating traffic for the public's safety. This 
Court should decline defendant's request to merge the DUI statute into the reckless 
driving statute. 
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II. UTAH'S SHONDEL DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE EACH 
STATUTE CONTAINS UNIQUE, DISTINCTIVE ELEMENTS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "where there is doubt or uncertainty as to 
which of two punishments is applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to the benefit 
of the lesser." State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969). The Utah Supreme 
Court extended this holding by requiring that "the criminal laws must be written so that 
there are significant differences between offenses and so that the exact same conduct is 
not subject to different penalties depending upon which of two statutory sections a 
prosecutor chooses to charge." State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d257,263 (Utah 1985). The Utah 
Supreme Court has summarized the Shondel doctrine by stating "that if two statutes are 
wholly duplicative as to the elements of the crime, the law does not permit a prosecutor to 
exercise the wholly unfettered authority to decide whether the crime should be charged as 
a misdemeanor or felony." Id, (emphasis added). 
The Shondel doctrine does not apply to this case because the DUI statute and the 
reckless driving statute contain elements that remain distinct from each other, and are 
therefore not "wholly duplicative as to the elements of the crime." Id. The trial court 
ruled correctly when it stated 
I do find that... the driving under the influence of alcohol with a passenger 
under 16 years of age in the vehicle are not identical [to the reckless 
driving statute], that the additional elements of being required to have the 
blood alcohol over a .08 or at least to the point where he is incapable of 
operating the motor vehicle safely because of his influence -because of the 
influence of the alcohol or the drugs is an additional element, and therefore 
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it is not an identical elements [sic], and the - of course with the additional 
element of being with a passenger under 16 years of age at the time, I find 
that there is no Shaundell [sic] problem here. 
R. 8. Reckless driving requires the commission of three or more traffic offenses. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b) (Supp. 2002). The DUI statute under which the 
defendant was found guilty requires an operator to be under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs, whereas the crime of reckless driving does not. Furthermore, the particular 
provision of the DUI statute under which the defendant was found guilty requires the 
additional element of a passenger under the age of sixteen years. See Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(B). The age and presence of a passenger is not an element of reckless 
driving. Each statute addresses wholly distinctive behaviors from individuals accused of 
crimes. For the foregoing reasons, the State requests that this Court deny the defendant's 
appeal to find that the DUI statute prohibits same conduct barred under the reckless 
driving statute. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Oral argument would not significantly aid the Court in deciding this case. Because 
this case raises no novel question of law, a published opinion would make no useful 
addition to the body of Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly determined that rules of statutory construction and the 
Shondel doctrine do not require merging the offense of driving under the influence of 
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alcohol with a passenger under the age of sixteen years, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(B) (1999), into the offense of reckless 
driving, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b) (Supp. 
2002). Statutes that relate to the same subject must be read in pari materia to give full 
effect to the statute's purposes. Defendant's narrow construction would render nearly all 
statutes under Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations of the Utah Code 
redundant and ineffectual. Additionally, defendant's Shondel argument fails because the 
DUI statute and the reckless driving statute contain elements distinct from each other, and 
each punishes wholly distinctive behavior. Based on the foregoing, defendant's 
conviction and sentence for driving under the influence of alcohol with a passenger under 
the age of sixteen years should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted o n ^ f ^ March 2003. 
DAVID YOCOM 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
LTHERP4EJEETERS 
JDepoty District Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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Utah Code Annotated 
§ 41-6-44(2)(a)(iii) and (3)(a)(ii)(B) Driving under the influence of alcohol with a 
passenger under the age of sixteen years, 
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle within this state if the person ... 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at 
the time of operation or actual physical control.... 
(3)(a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of 
Subsection (2) is guilty of a ... 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person ... 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
17 
Utah Code Annotated 
§ 41-6-45 Reckless Driving - Penalty, 
(1) A person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle: 
(a) in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property; 
or 
(b) while committing three or more moving traffic violations under Title 41, 
Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts within a single 
continuous period of driving. 




DAVID E YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KATHERINE PETERS, Bar No 9143 
Deputy Distnct Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801)468-3422 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 




Case No 015906524 
ERNESTO A HERNANDEZ, ) 
Defendant ) Honorable Ann Boyden 
The Court, having heard the stipulated tacts of this case and having heard argument by 
both parties Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On June 30, 2001 Ernesto A Hernandez, defendant did drive 82 miles per hour in 
a 60 mile per hour posted zone, 
2. Defendant failed to wear his seat belt, 
3. Defendant followed the vehicle in front of his at an unsafe distance, 
4. Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol with a breath alcohol 
content of .155 and 
5. Defendant had his daughter in the car at the time who was under the age of sixteen 
years 
ORDER 
Case No 015906524 
Page 2 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol requires unique elements, inconsistent 
with those required for Reckless Driving 
2 Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol requires that the operator of a motor 
vehicle be under the influence of alcohol or drugs whereas the crime of Reckless 
Dnvmg does not 
3. Additionally in this case the defendant was charged with Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol with a passenger under sixteen years of age in the vehicle A 
passengei under the dgc of sixteen in the vehicle is not an element of Reckless 
Dming 
4 Because Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol does not require evidence of 
tiaffic violations, although they may be used as contributing to a driving pattern, 
statutory constiuction is not relevant or at issue 
ORDER 
Case No. 015906524 
Page 3 
ORDER 
It is hereby ordered that Defendant's Motion to find his client guilty of Reckless Driving 
rather than the offenses of Driving under the Influence of Alcohol with a Passenger Under the 
Age of Sixteen, Speeding, Failure to Wear a Safety Belt and Following too Closely is hereby 
denied. 
SIGNED this _^T day of-jpaefxhl. 
BY THE COURT: 
'<z£c 
HONORABLE ANN BOYDEN 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
^e 
APPROVED AS TO FORM the Order on Defendant's Motion to Find the Defendant 
Guilty of Reckless Driving this day of June, 2002 
BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
ADDENDUM C 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERNESTO A. HERNANDEZ, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 015906524 
BEFORE: 
Trial 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on June 10, 2002) 
3 THE COURT: The matter that I have — I think the only 
4 matter I have, other than the Vaughn matter, is this Hernandez 
5 matter. 
6 MR. HAMILTON: That's going to be a relatively short 
7 matter. I'm not going to do a full-blown trial, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 MR. HAMILTON: What we're going to do— 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Hernandez, if you wish to — do you 
11 want to sit at the table? Thank you. We do need the 
12 interpreter, so you can pull a chair over by the defendant. 
13 This is State vs. Ernesto Alejandro Hernandez. Mr. Hernandez 
14 is here with Mr. Hamilton, and the matter was scheduled for a 
15 bench trial. I understand that you've stipulated to some of 
16 the facts and it's legal argument that you wish to address. 
17 MR. HAMILTON: Right. What we've stipulated to, your 
18 Honor, is that if there were a trial or if witnesses were 
19 sworn, that there would be testimony that would establish the 
20 elements of driving under the influence, a class A misdemeanor 
21 because of the child being in the vehicle. The elements would 
22 also be met about speeding. The elements would also be met 
23 with following too closely, even though these charges are not 
24 filed, it will be become important as I make an argument as to 
25 the issues I'm going to be arguing. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. HAMILTON: There would also be the elements that 
3 would be established for a seat belt violation. Now all four 
4 of those violations constitute — are found under Title 41 
5 Chapter 6, and about a year ago, the reckless driving statute 
6 was modified, and the reckless driving statute had added 
7 elements placed on it and another subsection added. 
8 Instead of just being the possibility of finding 
9 somebody guilty of reckless driving for driving with a 
10 willful disregard for the safety of persons or property, the 
11 legislature added another prong in the alternative that if 
12 while committing — a person guilty of reckless driving, if he 
13 operates a vehicle while committing three or more moving 
14 traffic violations under Title 41 Chapter 6, so we've 
15 stipulated to facts that would establish the elements of four 
16 offenses that are under Title 41 Chapter 6. 
17 Now there are two ways that we are asking the Court to 
18 find that the defendant be guilty only at this point of 
19 reckless driving and not the four violations underlying the 
20 reckless driving offense. The first of those arguments is that 
21 under Shaundell — State vs. Shaundell, it's found at 453 P.2d 
22 146, a Utah Supreme Court case from 1969. 
23 What Shaundell held was that if there are two statutes 
24 where the elements of the crimes are identical, then the person 
25 can only be convicted of the lesser of the statutes — lesser 
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1 offense. 
2 In the Shaundell case it was a case of possession of 
3 LSD, and there were two statutes under which the person could 
4 have been convicted under Shaundell. One was a class B 
5 misdemeanor and one was a third degree felony, and our Supreme 
6 Court said that if there's an option to charge under two 
7 different statutes where the elements are identical, then the 
8 State must only choose the lesser, and the Court could only 
9 convict under the lesser. 
10 So our contention is that the reckless driving 
11 statute incorporates the identical elements of the statutes 
12 that Mr. Hernandez is guilty of — speeding and DUI, following 
13 too closely and the seat belt violation. Therefore by 
14 incorporating them, they are identical in nature. The elements 
15 are exactly the same, and under the Shaundell decision this 
16 Court is now obligated to convict Mr. Hernandez only under the 
17 reckless driving statute. 
18 The alternative argument to that is that under the 
19 rules of statutory construction, if there is a statute that 
20 clearly incorporates another statute, it takes precedence over 
21 that other statute, and the Court is required to follow that 
22 statute. 
23 This statute of the reckless driving, 41-6-45, clearly 
24 incorporates the entire chapter of Title 41 Chapter 6, and 
25 therefore, if he's guilty of any moving traffic violations — 
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1 three or more moving traffic violations then he's guilty of 
2 reckless driving. 
3 That is the clear legislative intent. The plain 
4 language of the statute is that that's the only thing he can 
5 then be guilty of, and the Court is now obligated the follow 
6 the statute and convict him only of that offense of reckless 
7 driving. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you. Response? 
9 MS. PETERS: Thank you, your Honor. Under State vs. 
1 0
 Clark, 1981 case, the Court stated that if the elements of the 
11 crime are not identical and the appurtenant statutes require 
12 proof of some fact or element not required to establish the 
13 other then the statutes do not describe the same conduct and 
14 the defendant may be charged with the crime carrying the more 
15 severe sentence. 
16 In this case, a DUI is a more severe sentence because 
17 there are different elements that the defendant must — excuse 
18 me, that the State must prove. As Mr. Hamilton stated, under 
19 State vs. Shaundell, they need to be identical elements. The 
20 elements are not identical for a DUI for a seat belt violation, 
21 for driving too close — excuse me, following too close and for 
22 speeding. So therefore, I don't believe that this falls under 
23 Shaundell. 
24 THE COURT: Thank you. Any further argument? 
25 MR. HAMILTON: In response to that, your Honor, the 
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1 elements are identical because statutes are incorporated in, 
2 and therefore if he's guilty of those three — (inaudible) 
3 those three statutes, he's guilty of reckless driving. If all 
4 of the elements of those crimes are met, then he's guilty of 
5 reckless driving, therefore the elements are identical. 
6 I think where the State has a problem is that because 
7 this is a DUI case and a reckless driving, while it is still a 
8 class B misdemeanor, does not have the minimum mandatory 
9 sentence requirements, they believe that it should not be 
10 brought down to the reckless driving, and that's the sticky 
11 point. 
12 However, in looking at the plain language of the 
13 statute, there is not a way around — there is not a way to get 
14 around the fact that these are identical. It's if they are 
15 guilty of three or more traffic violations — moving traffic 
16 violations in violation of Title 41 Chapter 6, that equals a 
17 DUI — or reckless driving. That's the end of the story, 
18 that's what the statute says, and that's what's required. The 
19 Court is obligated to follow that, and the State didn't even 
20 respond to that aspect of the argument. 
21 Therefore, what we have is a situation where the 
22 statute dictates what should be done, and the Court is 
23 obligated to do it, just as if this were a situation of three 
24 lesser traffic offenses. If that were the case the Court would 
25 be obligated to convict the individual of reckless driving. 
~7
~ 
1 It doesn't — the statute doesn't distinguish between 
2 lesser or minor traffic violations or serious traffic 
3 violations. It says if it's a moving traffic violation under 
4 this title and chapter, it equals reckless driving. 
5 THE COURT: I know that we're going back and forth, 
6 but we've weighed the evidence and you didn't address the 
7 second (inaudible). 
8 MS. PETERS: Again, your Honor, the State just wanted 
9 to reiterate that the DUI is — especially in this case — is a 
10 more severe charge. The defendant was impaired, he had a child 
11 present, and these elements are not found under the reckless 
12 statute. He is — this is a DUI, it's a different — this is a 
13 different charge, and the elements are not the same, and it's 
14 not incorporated under reckless. It may be in the same 
15 chapter, but it's not — the elements are different and it's 
16 not meant to be taken, I believe, under Shaundell. 
17 MR. HAMILTON: In response to that, your Honor, if he 
18 were not guilty of DUI then he would be not be able to be 
19 convicted under reckless driving under 45. We're saying yeah, 
20 he is guilty of the DUI, we're admitting that. We're 
21 stipulating to the facts that would establish the elements of 
22 that offense. But it's because he is guilty of that and the 
23 other two, he is also guilty of the reckless driving statute, 
24 and the way the statute is written, he has to be convicted 
25 under the reckless driving statute. 
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1 THE COURT: All right, thank you. I've heard the 
2 argument that has been made by both attorneys. As to argument 
3 number one, the Shaundell issue, I do find that the elements of 
4 the crime as charged in this case, the driving under the 
5 influence of alcohol with a passenger under 16 years of age in 
6 the vehicle are not identical, that the additional elements of 
7 being required to have the blood alcohol over a .08 or at least 
8 to the point where he is incapable of operating the motor 
9 vehicle safely because of his influence — because of the 
10 influence of the alcohol or the drugs is an additional element, 
11 and therefore it is not an identical elements, and the — and 
12 of course with the additional element of being with a passenger 
13 under 16 years of age at the time, I find that there is no 
14 Shaundell problem there. I'm familiar with the Shaundell case, 
15 familiar with the elements that are involved, and find that 
16 there is not a Shaundell problem. 
17 As to the statutory construction argument made by 
18 defense Counsel, I also am not persuaded by that, Counsel. 
19 Mr. Hernandez is charged with driving under the influence of 
20 alcohol and failure to wear a seat belt. The fact that he 
21 comes in and pleads guilty or admits charges that have not even 
22 been charged does not then make the statutory construction an 
23 issue for this Court. 
24 He is simply charged with driving under the influence 
25 and with failure to wear the safety belt, and he may plead 
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1 guilty or not guilty to those as he chooses, but he does not 
2 get to come in and say, "I also want to plead guilty to 
3 different charges that have not even been charged," or 
4 additional charges that have not even been charged and then 
5 argue the statutory construction to say that he's now been 
6 found guilty of so many traffic offenses that it makes the 
7 reckless driving (inaudible). 
8 So — and specifically under these facts I find that 
9 the defense argument fails. I also find that the statutory 
10 construction argument would fail as a whole, that because the 
11 DUI does require different and additional elements and not just 
12 the violation of the traffic. The violation of traffic — the 
13 traffic offenses may in fact be evidence that a defendant is 
14 driving under the influence, but that is not the sole element, 
15 and that is not the sole finding that must be made in a 
16 conviction. 
17 A conviction for DUI is that the driving was such that 
18 the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs and 
19 could not capably safely — was not capable of safely driving 
20 the vehicle. Just the fact that that involved as evidence 
21 evidence of traffic violations that are not charged and are not 
22 prudent and are not even required to be proven while that may 
23 be part of the evidence, they are not required to be proven, it 
24 does not bring into issue for me either the statutory 
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lesser included offense, your Honor, and if we had a jury trial 
(inaudible) we would ask the Court to consider the lesser 
included offense and to ask for the construction of a lesser 
included, and therefore I believe that the argument should and 
could be made here at this point after the receiving of the 
proffered evidence or stipulated-to facts. 
In addition to that, if the Court is finding, based on 
what the Court has indicated, that the DUI has added elements 
that include an incapability of safely operating a vehicle, if 
the Court is ruling based on that, then we're going to ask the 
Court to dismiss or find Mr. Hernandez was not guilty of the 
other traffic violations if the Court is going to find him 
guilty of DUI, because that is simply evidence of the DUI and 
the incapability of safely operating the vehicle, 
THE COURT: He's not charged with it so I haven't 
found him guilty or not guilty— 
MR. HAMILTON: That's right, he wasn't. 
THE COURT: So you still want that clear on the 
record. All right, you've made— 
MR. HAMILTON: But your Honor, I do want to put on the 
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1 record as far as the lesser included offense of the reckless 
2 driving. 
3 THE COURT: That's true. My ruling on this was 
4 under — specifically under this case he is not charged with 
5 them, so they were not part of the statutory construction 
6 argument, and even if they were — had been charged, I do find 
7 that because there are additional elements that the statutory 
8 construction argument also does not hold because with the 
9 additional elements that are required for a DUI, and for the 
10 record, because as you state on the record that the driving 
11 under the — the defendant being incapable of safely driving is 
12 only one of an alternative element for a DUI, that the 
13 additional element of either driving under the influence to the 
14 extent that the defendant is not capable of safely driving or 
15 driving with a blood alcohol of .08 or greater, those are 
16 additional elements and therefore the Shaundell and the 
17 statutory construction arguments fail. 
18 Is the record clear that way? The State will need to 
19 prepare those findings and make a — get a copy of the tape if 
20 you need to for that. All right, thank you. 
21 That does bring us to the point, then, where the 
22 defendant has been — has admitted guilt to the DUI as a class 
23 A because a passenger was involved in there. The record also 
24 should reflect that that was an additional element that I 



























was that (inaudible) DUI is a class B, but it was as a class A 
with the child being present as well. 
The seat belt infraction was an additional charge that 
was not — the traffic charge that was argued as far as 
speeding, and I am going to therefore find that it is included 
as well, so that the only guilty — the only conviction I'm 
dealing with is Count I, driving under the influence as a class 
A with a minor; is that correct? 
MS. PETERS: Yes. 
THE COURT: How do you wish me to address this, 
Mr. Hamilton? The argument was simply that he was going to 
admit to that. I can take that— 
MR. HAMILTON: Well, we've stipulated to the evidence, 
so we would — I suppose the Court would find him now guilty 
based on the stipulation. 
THE COURT: To the evidence rather than having him 
come up and enter a plea because— 
MR. HAMILTON: That's right. 
THE COURT: —it is based on that. All right, and I 
think that is clear, unless there's anything further that the 
State has, that the stipulated evidence was that the evidence 
would show that he had — was driving under the influence of 
alcohol and that a child under the age of 16, I believe, is the 
element was under the — 1 6 years of age was present in the 
vehicle at the time. That is a class A misdemeanor. 
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1 Having found the defendant upon that stipulated 
2 evidence guilty of that class A misdemeanor, we need to address 
3 sentencing. Is this something that we need to get some 
4 presentence information? 
5 MR. HAMILTON: He has no priors, your Honor. We would 
6 like to waive time and ask that sentence be imposed today. 
7 THE COURT: Was there an accident here? 
8 MR. HAMILTON: No, there was a breath alcohol content 
9 of .15. 
10 THE COURT: .15 and no history. 
11 MR. HAMILTON: No. 
12 THE COURT: So this would be treated as a first 
13 offense. Does the State have anything further as far as 
14 sentencing goes? 
15 MS. PETERS: No, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: I think it is appropriate, then, that if 
17 the defendant wishes to waive that we can sentence at this time 
18 based on that, and that will at least put the defendant in a 
19 position to be pursuing any further remedies on this case. 
20 Mr. Hernandez, is there anything else you'd like me to 
21 know before I sentence you on this class A charge? 
22 MR. HERNANDEZ: No. 
23 THE COURT: No jail time been spent on this as well 
24 (inaudible) citations. 
25 MR. HERNANDEZ: No, I'm not, your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: All right, thank you. Mr. Hernandez, I am 
2 going to sentence you on the class A following the mandatory 
3 but minimum requirements and sentences as a first offense. 
4 Because it is a class A, I am going to impose 180 days jail. 
5 I'm going to suspend all but the mandatory two days jail, give 
6 you credit for the one day that you already spent in jail, and 
7 because there was no accident, even though there is a class A 
8 and a child was present, I — you have served one day in jail, 
9 and I will go ahead and allow you to do the remaining day 
10 additional 24 hours of community service. 
11 The rest is suspended and you are on probation to ISA 
12 for a period of 12 months. You will need to pay the minimum 
13 fine of $1500 in fines and fees. That includes a surcharge. 
14 You will also need to complete the DUI series and the victim 
15 impact series because a passenger was involved in this case — 
16 not series but class with the victim impact portion. ISA will 
17 supervise that and get you into the courses. 
18 The cost of the classes and the cost of supervision 
19 may be credited towards the $1500 fine. $100 a month minimum 
20 fine beginning on the last day of July and the last day of 
21 every month. Make sure that you're keeping track of the money 
22 that you're paying towards ISA so that it may be credited as 
23 well. 
24 The blood alcohol was below the .16, it was .15, so I 
25 will not need to address the (inaudible). Is there anything 
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1 else that I need to address on this before sentencing can be 
2 completed so that the case is in a position to be done with. 
3 Mr. Hamilton? 
4 MR. HAMILTON: No, your Honor, but if he does decide 
5 to appeal, can we approach the Court at that point and ask that 
6 the sentence be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal? 
7 THE COURT: You may approach me with that, yes. 
8 MR. HAMILTON: (Inaudible) confer with Counsel before 
9 doing "that, is that something we can do? 
10 THE COURT: Thank you. If you're going to do it, and 
11 I assume that if there is going to be an appeal they're going 
12 to want the findings of fact which have been — I requested you 
13 prepare as well, but I have no problem with your — does the 
14 State have any objection if this is appealed with my staying 
15 the sentence pending that appeal? 
16 MS. PETERS: No, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Since I haven't imposed any immediate jail 
18 time that seems appropriate, and if that is the case you may 
19 just approach me with a written motion to that effect. 
20 MR. HAMILTON: Thank you, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Thank you. 
22 MR. HAMILTON: That's all I have. 
23 (Hearing concluded) 
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